Turkey’s choice to park a Russian missile shield next to America’s crown jewel stealth jet lit the fuse on a fight that still decides who gets to hold the keys to the F-35.
Story Snapshot
- Turkey was expelled from the F-35 program after buying Russia’s S-400 system.
- U.S. law now blocks any F-35 transfer to Turkey until the S-400 is gone.
- Turkey still holds F-35 production gear, raising tech security concerns.
- Congress and key allies say readmitting Turkey would risk U.S. secrets.
How a NATO Ally Lost Access to America’s Top Fighter Jet
Turkey did not stumble out of the F-35 program by accident; it was pushed out after a clear warning and a clear choice. For years, Ankara was a full partner in the project, building about 900 parts for the jet and planning to buy dozens of aircraft. Then Turkey accepted Russia’s S-400 air defense system, even after the United States said this was a red line. The S-400 is built to hunt advanced aircraft, including the F-35, and it comes with Russian support and software.
Turkey has lobbied for F-35 readmission for years while refusing to give up the S-400, even while hosting a NATO base that stores American tactical nuclear weapons. My read: https://t.co/B9jDfr3ApU
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) July 7, 2026
The White House spelled out the risk in plain language: the F-35 “cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform” like the S-400. Defense officials warned that having both systems in the same environment would help Russia map the F-35’s radar signature and tactics. In 2019, Washington removed Turkey from the program and ordered all Turkish F-35 personnel to leave the United States by July 31. That move made Turkey the first NATO country ever pushed out of a major U.S. weapons program over buying Russian gear.
From Policy Fight to Hard Law Against F-35 Transfers
What began as a Pentagon security warning quickly hardened into binding law. Congress had already been skeptical that Turkey would protect F-35 technology and passed early limits on funding for jet deliveries. After the S-400 arrived, lawmakers wrote their judgment into the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020. Section 1245 now prohibits any transfer of F-35 aircraft, parts, technical data, or support to Turkey as long as it still possesses the S-400 system.
The law offers only a narrow escape hatch. It says the ban can lift if the Secretaries of State and Defense certify that Turkey no longer has the S-400 and gives “credible assurances” it will not buy similar Russian systems again. Analysts note that this would make a sale legal but not necessarily wise. On top of that, the United States sanctioned Turkey’s defense procurement agency under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, tying the fighter jet issue directly to punishment for Russian arms deals. For a conservative reading of the situation, this is exactly how common sense should work: you do not hand your most sensitive weapon to a partner that invites Russian technicians into the same room.
Lingering Equipment, Unmet Conditions, and Reverse-Engineering Fears
The story did not end with Turkey’s formal expulsion; the hangover has lasted for years. Because ending contracts overnight would be costly and disruptive, U.S. officials let Turkish factories keep making certain F-35 parts through 2022. Reports now say Turkish aerospace facilities still retain some F-35 production equipment five years after the expulsion. That raises an obvious security question: what happens to advanced tooling and designs in a country that is drifting closer to Russia and Iran?
Trump, in Ankara: "We don't want to sanction friends." He says he will remove the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey.
CAATSA, the sanctions regime imposed in 2020 alongside Turkey's F-35 expulsion, is the actual legal mechanism blocking both the F-35 readmission and the broader defense…
— The Tectonic (@thetect0nic) July 7, 2026
So far, no public source proves that Turkey has successfully reverse-engineered the jet’s technology. The concern is about opportunity, not proven theft. Congress also points out that Turkey has not met a single one of the statutory conditions for certification under Section 1245. It still possesses the S-400, has not given up on Russian platforms, and has not offered credible assurances it will stop. Lawmakers warn that allowing F-35 transfers under these conditions would expose U.S. military secrets to Russian intelligence, which fits basic American conservative instincts about deterrence: protect your edge or lose it.
Pressure to Readmit Turkey Versus Security and Alliance Values
Turkey’s leaders argue the expulsion was unfair and say their long service as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally should earn them a way back into the program. Some reports claim Ankara is looking for ways to remove or return the S-400 to Russia, which, if verified, could technically clear the narrow legal bar for reconsidering F-35 sales. At the same time, a bipartisan group of at least forty U.S. lawmakers has urged the State Department to reject any readmission request until Turkey removes the Russian system and stops threatening neighbors like Greece and Cyprus.
Policy experts now frame the F-35 dispute as part of a larger pattern: the United States restricts advanced defense technology when allies buy Russian systems and flirt with adversaries. Calls from think tanks rooted in national security circles say Washington should hold a firm line—no F-35s while S-400s sit on Turkish soil, and no advanced jets for a government that backs groups like Hamas and menaces Israel. That stance reflects conservative values of clarity and accountability: alliances matter, but the safety of American pilots and the secrecy of U.S. technology matter more. Until Turkey proves it has chosen the West over Moscow in deeds, not words, trusting it with the F-35 looks less like strategy and more like wishful thinking.
Sources:
defensenews.com, war.gov, bbc.com, turkishminute.com, aei.org, thehill.com, npr.org
